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DIVERGENT LEGAL CONCEPTIONS OF 
THE STATE: IMPLICATIONS FOR 




Different areas of law appear to conceive of the state in fundamentally dif-
ferent ways.  In particular, public international law, in its twentieth century 
guise, has tended to conceive of the state as a unified legal person, a perpetual 
entity able to bind itself into the future.  Domestic administrative and constitu-
tional law in the common law tradition, by contrast, does not conceive of the 
state at all, but rather views the government apparatus as a series of disaggre-
gated entities often competing with each other for power, subject to checks and 
balances, and enjoying a temporally contingent mandate.  Indeed, in many con-
stitutional democracies, often it is the constitution itself that comes closest to a 
domestic embodiment of statehood. 
A central premise of this paper is that the success of the various strategies 
for the development of transnational systems of governance will depend on how 
well they integrate or assimilate these differing domestic and international legal 
archetypes of the state.  The paper begins by suggesting different ways in which 
the competing conceptions have been, and can be, integrated and assimilated.  
British colonial law’s successful integration of the international and domestic 
law sovereign in the office of the Crown at the point of acquiring new territory 
is an important historical example and is considered first.  The prevalence of co-
lonial law at earlier times of transnational government also has tended to ob-
scure the significance of the fundamental differences between domestic and in-
ternational legal conceptions as they sometimes present themselves today.  A 
contemporary technique that has further masked these differences is dualism.  
The limitations of this technique, given the expansion of international rulemak-
ing, are briefly considered. 
The paper proceeds from the premise that the different techniques by which 
spaces for global governance can be and have been created are important for, 
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but distinct from, an evaluation of the capacity for a global administrative law to 
operate within those spaces so created.  The sites of global governance are not 
necessarily the sites of global administrative law.  Yet how the global space is 
created may have an impact on which of the techniques and functions of admin-
istrative law are likely to be effective. 
Domestic administrative law in the British Commonwealth tradition tends 
to focus on judge-made, ex post supervision of administration.1  Information 
disclosure regimes, access to information, ombudsmen complaint procedures, 
and the analysis of institutional design have only relatively recently attracted 
general attention among common law administrative lawyers outside of the 
United States.  For the most part, the ex ante notice and comment rulemaking 
procedures that characterize U.S. administrative law have not been embraced in 
other common law jurisdictions, except in a piecemeal statute-specific way, and 
are commonly perceived as overly legalistic.2  These different techniques of 
domestic administrative law, then, fulfill different functions and promote differ-
ent and sometimes conflicting values.  Ex post judicial supervision of decision-
making, for example, may variously fulfill the functions of centralizing control, 
legitimating both the decisionmaker and the decision (without necessarily im-
posing constraints or control), interpolating values into the decisionmaking 
process, enhancing rationality, or enforcing participation.  Information and no-
tice–and-comment regimes have participation as their core concerns.  Not all of 
these techniques or functions of domestic administrative law are equally effec-
tive on their own terms, nor are they equally readily translatable to the different 
sites of global governance. 
This paper goes on to identify how two different kinds of global space are 
created and to evaluate the prospects for certain functions of administrative 
law, as we understand it domestically, to be effective within those spaces.  It 
identifies domestic administrative law doctrine as having the capacity to assimi-
late domestic and international conceptions of the state by uniting the executive 
in its domestic and foreign affairs personas (thus creating a space for global ad-
ministrative law to operate).  Within this space, domestic administrative law has 
developed disciplines by which it can receive and domesticate fundamental in-
ternational law norms. 
As much as domestic and international public law apparently share similar 
values, one’s views of how those values ought to operate tend to be affected by 
one’s conception of statehood.  In some cases the apparent coherence between 
domestic and international norms—and particularly human rights norms—may 
prove to be illusory precisely because the domestic and international systems 
 
 1. This is reflected in the focus of DAVID DYZENHAUS, EMERGING FROM SELF-INCURRED 
IMMATURITY (Institute for International Law and Justice, Global Administrative Law Series, Working 
Paper 2005/1). 
 2. There are, of course, many exceptions.  For example, consultation processes are commonly im-
posed by legislation in New Zealand; environmental and planning regimes confer broad notification 
and participation rights.  See, e.g., Resource Management Act, 1991 R S vol 32 ss93-95 (N.Z.). 
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differ fundamentally in how they conceive of the state.  A norm may be under-
stood differently as a consequence of how the state is imagined in the domestic 
and international spheres. 
The second kind of global space on which the article briefly focuses poses 
greater challenges for the operation of administrative law values and functions 
(at least as they are understood in domestic administrative law).  It identifies a 
further strategy for the integration and assimilation of the international and 
domestic conceptions of the state that creates a space for global governance by 
disaggregating the state into functional units (both public and private) in both 
the domestic and international spheres.  Paradoxically, however, this very strat-
egy for enhancing the prospects for transnational government may also hinder 
the applicability of administrative law techniques and values.  There is no rea-
son to suppose the problems about the reach of administrative law techniques 
and values encountered in the domestic context will be eliminated in the global 
sphere. 
II 
DISGUISING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONCEPTIONS OF THE STATE 
The presence of a distinct legal person of the state in its external legal af-
fairs, and the apparent absence of one in the internal governmental order, is 
striking and carries with it important implications.  It should make us uneasy 
about the relationship between domestic and international public law and about 
the notions of sovereignty on which they depend.  Yet, this striking difference in 
how international and domestic public lawyers imagine the state as a legal per-
son is not obvious most of the time.  This section explores the ways in which the 
differences in conception have traditionally been disguised and why these par-
ticular strategies are no longer as viable as they once were. 
A. Colonial Law 
The history of empire and colonization reminds us that the distinctions be-
tween domestic and international law conceptions of state have not always been 
either important or apparent.  Until the twentieth century, public international 
law had been parsimonious about which groups could be accorded international 
legal personality and could thus be regarded as having the legal status of states.3  
While relationships between those states belonging to the European Family of 
Nations were mediated by international law, it was not international but colo-
nial law that governed most of the interactions between sovereigns and the in-
habitants of the “new” territories.  Relationships now governed by the law of 
 
 3. Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century 
International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 1-7 (1999); SIR KENNETH ROBERTS-WRAY, 
COMMONWEALTH AND COLONIAL LAW (1966).  The number of states has been vastly expanded in the 
post-colonial era. 
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nations were in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries governed 
by, for example, English, Dutch, Belgian, or French colonial law. 
A number of lessons can be learned from the British colonial experience.  
The British Empire was, after all, a transnational government of an earlier era.4  
The merging of the international and domestic in the Colonial Crown was criti-
cal to the legal implementation of colonization.  The obvious point at which the 
internal and external concepts of state collapsed was at the point of the initial 
colonial encounter itself.  On acquisition or conquest of new territory, actions 
that began as an exercise of external foreign affairs power often simultaneously 
set the terms for the internal governance of that territory.  The concept of the 
Crown enveloped any potential differences between the sovereign’s foreign af-
fairs and internal constitutional roles.  External prerogative power was simulta-
neously constituent power. 
The sacred prerogative of the Crown under British colonial law included 
powers to acquire territory and to constitute a local legislature.5  Promises made 
to the indigenous people in the process of acquiring territory, whether by way 
of proclamation, treaty, or charter, were (at least in earlier times) regarded by 
the courts as binding on the Crown in its subsequent governance of the terri-
tory.6  While it was unclear what status treaties and charters made with indige-
nous inhabitants would have had at international law, they were efficacious as a 
matter of colonial law and regarded as proof of the voluntary abandonment of 
the prerogative rights of the Crown.7  In the absence of treaties conferring rights 
 
 4. Executive government was not territorially defined—at least as far as the law was concerned.  
According to colonial law, the sovereign governed his subjects outside his territory and could, by char-
ter, confer on them exclusive rights to trade or to settle outside territory that were enforceable at Eng-
lish law (The Great Case of Monopolies 36 Car. II 1684).  It still was not clear as late as 1698 whether 
the Crown needed Parliament's agreement to confer such charters.  For example, statute 9 & 10 Gul. 
III c. 44, created a new East India Company.  In form, the legislation did not directly threaten the 
Crown's prerogative.  It did not directly grant an exclusive right to trade on the East India Company 
but instead created the corporation to whom the King was to grant Charters.  This allowed the King's 
prerogative rights to be retained at the same time as recognizing a role for Parliament.  See SIR W. W. 
HUNTER, A HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA 317-20 (1900). 
The Crown was regarded in law as a single and indivisible entity throughout the Empire.  The 
Crown, represented by a single person and single office, was sovereign in relation to the whole of the 
British Empire (notwithstanding the differing democratic and constitutional status of the various terri-
tories).  Political practice was quite another matter.  Executive power was jealously guarded as a meas-
ure of political independence in the colonies long before domestic parliaments achieved full law-
making powers. 
 5. Phillips v. Eyre, 6 Eng. Rep. 1, 18 (Q.B. 1870); Campbell v. Hall (1774), 1 Cowp. 204, [1558-
1774] All ER Rep 251, 98 ER 1045. 
 6. In Campbell, 1 Cowp. 204, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, Lord Mansfield concluded that a mere proclama-
tion could effect a binding promise.  Upon winning Grenada from the French, for example, the English 
articles of capitulation promised the inhabitants that they should pay no higher duties than those im-
posed by the French King until the new King's pleasure be known.  By a subsequent proclamation and 
letters patent the Crown stated that an assembly would be the institution to make laws for the territory 
and appointed a Governor to summon such assembly.  Before the Governor had been dispatched from 
England, the King issued a further proclamation increasing the duty.  Lord Mansfield held that the lat-
ter proclamation was void to the extent that it contradicted the earlier undertakings.  They had binding 
effect within the territory. 
 7. Mayor of Lyons v. East India Co (1836) 1 Moo PC 175, 287. 
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of British subjects on local people, for example, the subjects of a ceded or con-
quered territory would have been treated as aliens under British law. 
The Colonial Crown was regarded in these circumstances as capable of be-
ing bound by its previous promises simultaneously as a matter of “domestic” 
and external or “international” law, as well as morality.  Crown proclamations, 
at least those made upon the assumption of jurisdiction over newly “discov-
ered” or acquired lands, were treated as having force and effect.  A kind of so-
cial contract between the new sovereign and the people, on which sovereignty 
was conditioned, was overtly recognized in the legal analysis.  The constituent 
aspects of the state, at least in relation to the point of its inception, so often 
suppressed in our modern law, were able to be recognized.  In the twentieth 
century, judges have but rarely accorded such instruments the status of the 
Magna Carta or treated them as the equivalent of an entrenched provision in a 
constitution.8  The farther we are in time from the initial point of acquisition, 
the harder it is to give effect to such undertakings in the absence of formal in-
corporation into a constitutional higher law document. 
This distinct conception of the Crown in colonial law is not merely a histori-
cal oddity we need not trouble with today.  Questions remain about the status 
of promises that are part of the constituent act of creating states.  The New Zea-
land political and legal system, for example, continues to struggle with which in-
stitutions are committed by the undertakings made by Queen Victoria’s repre-
sentatives to Maori in the Treaty of Waitangi 1840.9  Even today, Maori appeal 
for redress of grievances to the Crown as if it were a unified and apolitical en-
tity.  This view, that the Crown’s commitments under the Treaty of Waitangi 
are pre-political and constituent of the state itself, and that in fulfilling such 
commitments the Crown neither engages with nor is bound to engage with de-
mocratic processes, is understandable when viewed against the colonial concep-
tion of the Crown.10  This article will discuss how contemporary domestic and 
international courts consider constituent acts of state.  The important point, for 
now, is to notice how such acts were regarded as a matter of colonial law. 
 
 8. See, e.g., the New Zealand case of Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 
72, 78 in which Judge Prendergast suggested that the Treaty of Waitangi between Maori and the British 
Crown was "a simple nullity."  Contrast, R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Af-
fairs, ex parte Indian Association of Alberta, [1982] 2 All ER 118, 124 per Judge Denning citing Judge 
Laskin in Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145 at 203 suggesting 
that the promises by the King to the Native American peoples should be treated as "analogous to the 
status of the Magna Carta" and "as a fundamental document upon which any just determination of 
original rights rests." 
 9. See, e.g., Te Heu Heu Tukino v. Attorney-General [1999] 1 NZLR 98, deciding that the Treaty 
is binding on the Crown but not on state-owned enterprises. 
 10. Some Maori also argue that as a collective entity they should be viewed as an international le-
gal person who continues to treat with the Crown.  This conception of the Crown is reflected in the par-
liamentary practice of enacting settlements between government and particular tribes without amend-
ment.  See, e.g., Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement enacted as Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998 No. 97 
(N.Z.). 
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British colonial law may in earlier centuries have created a space distinct 
from the domains of international and domestic law and camouflaged the dif-
ferences between them.  This should serve as a reminder that statehood, as it is 
presently understood in international law, is a relatively recent phenomenon 
that may not be strong enough to withstand, at least in its archetypal form, the 
proliferation of states over the past century. 11  Archetypes do, however, matter.  
Many of the current legal controversies concerning indigenous peoples have as 
one of their causes the differences between the contemporary international law 
and historical, colonial law accounts of statehood. 
B. Contemporary Methods That Disguise the Distinction: Dualism 
The most obvious contemporary means for reconciling the distinct concep-
tions of the state in domestic and international law is dualism.  Dualism requires 
that for an international agreement to have domestic legal effect, it must be in-
corporated into municipal law.12  In this way, English legal positivism has lim-
ited the Crown’s juristic status in both the international and domestic spheres.  
Parliament retains its (nineteenth-century) place as the font of sovereignty.  The 
attempts to improve parliamentary-based treaty processes can be viewed as part 
of this continuing dualist tradition. 
While adapting and developing these strategies is an important task, they 
will never be a complete answer, given the expanding regulatory subject areas 
being confronted at an international level and the increasing degree to which 
power is delegated to executive bodies within treaty frameworks.  Two exam-
ples from New Zealand help to illustrate this point.  The Trade Marks Act 
200213 so deeply embeds the Paris or TRIPS agreements14 into the statutory 
framework that the legislation cannot be understood without reference to the 
texts of the international agreements. The Act refers to the agreements without 
detailing what is said in the text.  Indeed, the legislation can never stand on its 
own because it also refers to the Paris or TRIPS agreements as “revised or 
amended from time to time.”  Even more controversial are provisions such as 
those contained in the Climate Change Response Act 200215 that give effect to 
the Kyoto Agreement.  The Act not only incorporates into New Zealand law 
what already has been agreed to in the Treaty process but also gives any agree-
ments that will be entered into in the future the status of law.  It incorporates by 
reference any decisions, rules, guidelines, measures or modifications, or agree-
 
 11. See M. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2001); Anghie supra note 3, at 1-7. 
 12. See, e.g.,  R v. Home Secretary ex parte Brind [1991] 2 WLR 588, 591 H per Lord Bridge. 
 13. 2002 no. 49 (N.Z.). 
 14. Convention for the protection of Industrial Property signed at Paris on 20 March 1883 as re-
vised or amended from time to time and Agreement on Trade related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
rights set out in Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement, as revised or amended from time to time.  See s 5,  
2002 no. 49 (N.Z.). 
 15. 2002 no. 40 (N.Z.). The English text of the Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on 
Climate Change done at Kyoto on 11 December 1997 appears in Schedule 2. 
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ments made under the Kyoto Protocol for the future.16  Under the Act these 
automatically receive the legal force of regulations. 
The question of how the traditional practices of dualism can properly ac-
commodate processes for the elaboration of treaties is inevitable.  The prob-
lems of reaching agreement at the domestic level are, if anything, exacerbated 
in the international sphere.  Unsurprisingly, this leads to general texts that re-
quire further elaboration in individual cases and further rulemaking by “execu-
tive type” processes—either through international institutions or through the 
cooption of national ones, or both.  Many treaties explicitly set up institutions 
for their own elaboration—either of a judicial or quasi-judicial kind, or of a ple-
nary character.  The most interesting of these, at least to a domestic public law-
yer, are those that contain provisions empowering the member states freely to 
amend the original treaty.  Though the analogy is not completely apt, these can 
be likened to Henry VIII clauses in domestic public law in which Parliament by 
statute empowers the executive to change the statute at a later date.  Some 
treaty arrangements require elaboration by resolution of an executive commit-
tee.  These arrangements are similar to situations in domestic law in which an 
executive order is subject to legislative confirmation. 
Domestic administrative law has taught that legislative processes cannot be 
used to decide everything.  Administrative law is concerned (inter alia) with the 
implementation of general rules in particular cases and the making of more de-
tailed rules within broad legislative frameworks.  More should not be expected 
from democratic legislative processes at the international level than is expected 
at the national level. 
Some would like to treat the E.U. experience of institutional dominance by 
bureaucratic institutions as sui generis.  From an administrative lawyer’s per-
spective, the development of strategies for the implementation or elaboration of 
treaty commitments demonstrates a paradox.  The institutional expansion of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and E.C. may be credited, in part, to the on-
erous procedures required by the Treaty of Rome before it could be amended.  
The expansion of ECJ jurisdiction may be traced to the requirement for unani-
mous agreement by member states before amendments to the original treaty 
could be made and to the stringent internal domestic procedures required by 
some member states in turn before they could agree to such changes.  Unanim-
ity of member states and internal domestic requirements of agreement (includ-
ing by way of voter referendum) may have contributed to the institutional 
autonomy of the bureaucratic and judicial parts of the Union.17  Whether such 
delegations are explicit or not, systems always will find elaboration and imple-
mentation mechanisms.  Either way—whether or not the substantive provisions 
of a Treaty are more or less “democratically mandated”—institutions for its im-
 
 16. Section 51 , 2002 no. 40 (N.Z.). 
 17. See M. SHAPIRO & A. STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS AND JUDICIALIZATION 266-67 
(2002) (explaining why member states never overturned the ECJ's interpretation of treaties). 
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plementation and elaboration are likely to evolve.  To generalize the E.U. ex-
perience may be to predict that making one part of the system more democratic, 
in an electoral-legislative sense, will contribute to the institutional autonomy of 
another. 
The inherent limitations of dualism as a strategy, in these circumstances, 
ought to be obvious.  The question then is not whether processes should be de-
veloped for the legislative, judicial, and administrative elaboration of treaties, 
but which processes are to be preferred and how states and citizens should be 
represented in such processes.  The success of such processes will depend on 
how well the various contemporary strategies integrate or assimilate the domes-
tic and international legal conceptions of the state. 
Two possibilities for such processes are (1) the capacity for domestic admin-
istrative law to embrace international law rules and norms and (2) the prospects 
for an international administrative law to apply in the global spaces created by 
the forces of deregulation and privatization. 
III 
THE PERMEABILITY OF DOMESTIC  
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TO INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
National courts have great potential to act as agents for the elaboration and 
implementation of international law norms through the doctrines of administra-
tive law.18  Administrative law in New Zealand, Canada, and to a lesser extent, 
Australia, has become increasingly permeable to both constitutional and inter-
national law norms and an important means by which incorporation doctrine 
has been circumvented in recent years.  The “hole in the donut” of executive 
discretion may well provide a channel for both the integration of the external 
state and internal executive and of international and domestic law norms. 
International norms have increasingly been used to constrain and structure 
administrative discretion.  Courts in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, for 
example, have founded legal consequences on the act of ratification of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.19  The act of ratification 
by itself without incorporation is capable of triggering legal standards against 
which departures from such undertakings must be justified.20  The question of 
exactly what the legal consequences of ratification should be has remained a 
matter for domestic administrative law to decide.  The cases differ as to whether 
ratification of the particular international obligations in individual cases can 
 
 18. Of course, administrative law also serves other instrumental and normative purposes, some of 
which will be discussed in a later section. 
 19. Tavita v. Minister of Immigration [1993] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257; Minister of State for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 (Austl.); and Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. On the latter see the book of a conference devoted to consideration 
of the case: THE UNITY OF PUBLIC LAW (David Dyzenhaus ed., 2004). 
 20. David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt & Michael Taggart, The Principle of Legality in Administrative 
Law: Internationalisation as Constitutionalisation, 1 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 5 (2001). 
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give rise to a legitimate expectation,21 form the basis of a mandatory relevant 
consideration,22 or constitute a matter to which the decisionmaker ought to be 
“alert, alive, and sensitive.”23  Other possible consequences may also be avail-
able in other cases involving different international obligations.24 
Both the fact and the content of the executive’s international commitments 
contribute to the permeability of administrative law in these cases.  The first 
element focuses on the desirability for consistency of the executive’s express 
undertakings as a matter of administrative law.  The second element focuses on 
the desirability of unifying the norms themselves.  While in practice these two 
elements tend to intersect, they shall be kept separate for the purposes of this 
discussion. 
Increasingly as a matter of domestic administrative law, executive undertak-
ings by way of published policies and specific representations to individuals 
have been held by courts to give rise to legal obligations.25  Such developments 
contribute to enhancing the permeability of domestic administrative law to in-
ternational law values and processes.  Commitments made by the executive in 
the international sphere have at least as much, if not more, claim to legal signifi-
cance as these domestic undertakings.  The common administrative law motiva-
tion here is to maintain the consistency and integrity of, and the citizens’ ability 
to rely on, executive undertakings in whichever sphere they are made.  The ef-
fect, in the international law cases, is to unify the executive qua external state 
persona and the executive qua internal persona, with the assistance of the do-
mestic courts. 
The ideal that “[p]ublic power must . . . at a minimum, exhibit some kind of 
fidelity to the values it has itself expressly adopted” is present in all of these 
cases.26  The executive’s voluntary undertaking is the focus of this strand of rea-
soning.  In Teoh, for example, the majority was concerned that the solemn un-
dertaking at international law should not be dismissed as “merely platitudinous 
or ineffectual”27 and in Tavita as “at least partly window-dressing.”28  In a recent 
 
 21. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273 (Austl.). 
 22. Tavita [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257. 
 23. Baker [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. 
 24. Claudia Geiringer, Tavita and all That: Confronting the Confusion Surrounding Unincorporated 
Treaties and Administrative Law, 21 NEW ZEALAND U. L. REV. 66 (2004).  The interaction between the 
wording of the convention in the Teoh, Tavita, and Baker cases and the context of the statutory discre-
tion (a dispensing power) makes it difficult to suggest that the Convention could act as a constraint on 
the scope of the power here, though one can think of other cases in which the wording would not be so 
constraining.  Indeed, the UNCRC indicates that the interests of the child are a matter to be weighed as 
"a [primary] consideration" (Article 3). 
 25. See, e.g., SOREN J. SCHONBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
(2000); ROBERT THOMAS, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND PROPORTIONALITY IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2000). 
 26. Mayo Moran, Authority, Influence and Persuasion: Baker, Charter Values and the Puzzle of 
Method, in THE UNITY OF PUBLIC LAW 389, 404 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 2004). 
 27. Id. at 402, quoting Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 
C.L.R. 273, 291 (Austl.) per Mason CJ and Deane J. 
 28. Tavita v. Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257, 266; Moran, supra note 26 at 402. 
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New Zealand decision, Justice Glazebrook also emphasized the desirability for 
consistency within the executive’s publicly addressed values.  She was con-
cerned that the New Zealand refugee operational instructions referred to some, 
but not all, of the UNHCR guidelines.29  The potential impropriety here was in 
the executive “picking and choosing” between its international commitments—
at least without good reason.30 
Focusing on the fact of the commitment itself may also contribute to a 
greater definition of institutional hierarchies at the international level.  The fact 
of the commitment sometimes leads directly to questions about the quality of 
the commitment.  New Zealand judicial decisions, for example, have begun 
more finely to differentiate between international law texts.31  In Refugee Coun-
cil v. Attorney-General, Justice McGrath was careful to acknowledge that the 
“executive guidelines” issued by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (a 
non-elected U.N. official), while helpful in interpreting the Convention, did not 
enjoy the same status as resolutions of the UNHCR executive committee, an as-
sembly of state representatives.32  This may be regarded as an early attempt to 
insinuate some kind of institutional separation of powers into the international 
sphere.  The international bodies may, however, be even more difficult to clas-
sify in domestic constitutional law separation of powers terms than Justice 
McGrath acknowledges.  The Executive Committee is established by the High 
Commissioner’s Office, does not include all parties to the Convention, and cur-
rently includes four members who are not parties to the Convention.33  This is, 
at least, a start.  As a general matter, the more seriously international commit-
ments are taken by domestic administrative courts, the greater the incentive for 
states to be careful and disciplined about the content of decisions and the design 
of international decisionmaking processes.  These developments may, however, 
also increase the difficulties of reaching agreement in the international sphere. 
Viewed from the perspective of how successfully they rationalize external 
and domestic conceptions of the state, cases such as Teoh (Australia), Tavita 
(New Zealand), and Baker (Canada) take on a different significance from that 
usually ascribed them.  Each of these cases was triggered by the executive’s un-
dertaking (in its international persona) obligations under the U.N. Convention 
on the Rights of the Child.  In each case the commitment affected the execu-
tive’s exercise of its discretion in its domestic persona.  There was no direct 
clash with Parliament here—in each case Parliament had delegated to the ex-
ecutive the decision about what “humanitarian” factors would include.  The 
 
 29. Refugee Council v. Attorney-General [2003] 2 N.Z.L.R. 577, 650 per Glazebrook J. 
 30. Justice Glazebrook treated the UNHCR guidelines as having the same status as judicial deci-
sions from other jurisdictions. Refugee Council, 650. 
 31. Treasa Dunworth, Public International Law, NEW ZEALAND L. REV. 411, 415-18 (2004). 
 32. [2003] 2 N.Z.L.R. 577, 612, per McGrath J. 
 33. The Committee currently has 66 members including India, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Thailand 
who are not parties to the Convention: http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/excom.  (My thanks to 
Treasa Dunworth for assistance on this point). 
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judges were being asked to give effect to a general norm (otherwise unelabo-
rated) in an international treaty when interpreting a general norm (otherwise 
unelaborated) in a legislative provision. 
None of the above arguments necessarily depends on the content of the in-
ternational agreement—though in practice the content has been an important 
factor in determining the proper weight to be given those agreements in the 
administrative decision itself.  The second set of arguments focuses not so much 
on the fact of the undertaking, but on the fundamental nature of its content.  
The motivation here is to use administrative law to unify fundamental constitu-
tional, administrative, and international law norms.  According to this line of 
reasoning, the fundamental content of the undertaking is the source of the 
commitment.  David Dyzenhaus sums up this approach: “Baker seems best un-
derstood as a decision that conceives of public law as based in a set of funda-
mental values, which are expressed—sometimes in different ways—in adminis-
trative law, in constitutional law and in international law.” 34 
One’s evaluation of the strength of such a claim will depend on the position 
one takes in relation to the domestic administrative law controversy about 
whence administrative law derives its values.35  Are judges in administrative law 
cases acting as agents for Parliament and enforcing Parliament’s intent and val-
ues, as the traditional view tends to portray them?36  Or is Parliament presumed 
to legislate against a “rule of law” floor of fundamental values as Lord Steyn 
has suggested when applying the “principle of legality” in administrative law 
cases?37  Or, indeed, are the values of administrative law freestanding and de-
rived from the common law itself, as Lord Cooke has articulated?38  The declin-
ing dominance of the first of these approaches and the ascendance of the latter 
two–sometimes both embraced by the “principle of legality”—has increased the 
permeability of administrative law to arguments about fundamental norms.  By 
this, the courts have been able simultaneously to domesticate international hu-
manitarian values and to seek external validation of the content of domestic 
humanitarian norms.  International law need not be the source of a norm’s au-
 
 34. THE UNITY OF PUBLIC LAW 1 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 2004). 
 35. This is not a controversy triggered exclusively by the question of what role international treaty 
law should play.  The changing internal organization of government, privatization, outsourcing, and 
new methods of regulation mean that this question matters in other contexts as well—in order to apply 
administrative law doctrines to entities that are not based on statute but are nevertheless sufficiently 
"public." See, e.g., R v. Panel of TakeOvers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] 1 QB 815, 848. 
 36. Richard Stewart's transmission belt theory still retains its adherents in the British Common-
wealth.  See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1669, 1671-76 (1975). 
 37. Lord Steyn describes the "principle of legality" in these terms: "In the absence of contrary indi-
cations it must be presumed that Parliament entrusted the wide power to make decisions [to the Home 
Secretary] on the supposition that the Home Secretary would not act contrary to such a fundamental 
principle of our law." R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Pierson [1998] 1 AC 
539, 590. 
 38. For Lord Cooke of Thorndon the "common law by itself is being recognised as a sufficient 
source of the fundamental right": R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly 
[2001] UKHL 26, ¶ 30-31. 
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thority, but rather evidence of the norm itself.  The methodology is norm-
reinforcing.  Audrey Macklin describes the process (again from a Canadian per-
spective): “When immigration lawyers invoke international law in aid of a 
Charter challenge, they call on the cosmopolitan antecedents of the Charter.  
When they invoke international law directly in aid of statutory interpretation, 
they encourage the internalisation of universal normative commitments within 
the national legal frame.”39 
Developments in administrative law in the British Commonwealth have en-
hanced its permeability to international norms.  Administrative law’s interest in 
maintaining the consistency and integrity of executive undertakings in which-
ever sphere they are made, combined with its search for unified fundamental 
values, makes it more likely to be influenced by international law processes and 
norms.  There is a coincidence of common law and international law values and 
the permeability of administrative law to both. 
IV 
THE LIMITS OF COORDINATING NORMS 
While administrative, constitutional, and international law norms appear to 
cohere, sometimes significant obstacles impede the translation of these norms 
across the conceptual divide between domestic and international spheres.  The 
apparent or potential coherence between international and domestic constitu-
tional norms sometimes unravels exactly because of the different conceptions of 
state operating in domestic and public international law.  The constituent ele-
ments of statehood tend to be even more suppressed in international law than 
in domestic constitutional law. 
A. Constitutions as Constituent Acts 
A Canadian example may help to make the point.  Canada explicitly has in-
corporated the norms contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights in its Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Both texts guarantee equal 
protection of the law and freedom of conscience and religion (among other 
things).40  Domestic and international courts have been asked on a number of 
occasions to determine whether such human rights guarantees clash with other 
constitutional commitments.41  In these cases, the differences between interna-
tional and domestic conceptions of state can be material to the result. 
 
 39. Audrey Macklin, The State of Law's Borders and the Law of State's Borders, in THE UNITY OF 
PUBLIC LAW 173, 175 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 2004) (describing the process from a Canadian perspec-
tive).  We should notice, however, that the Canadian Charter does not protect the rights of children but 
the Supreme Court nevertheless found a way to give effect to children's interests in Baker. 
 40. Articles 2, 14, and 18 ICCPR and s15 and s2 CCRF respectively. 
 41. E.g., Adler v. Ontario [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609; Public School Boards Association v. Alberta (A-G) 
[2000] 2 SCC 410; Waldman v. Canada, 7 IHRR 368 (2000); Re: An Act to Amend the Education Act 
[1987] 1 SCR 1148 [Bill 30 Act] (Can.). 
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The 1867 Constitution created a United Canada and implemented and in-
corporated important compacts made at the time of Confederation.  The consti-
tutional text documents the promises that were constitutive of nationhood (in-
cluding, inter alia, special guarantees to the indigenous peoples).  Importantly, 
for present purposes, it guaranteed certain rights and privileges to the Roman 
Catholic minority in Ontario and reciprocal rights and privileges to the Protes-
tant minority in Quebec.  Section 93 granted each province exclusive jurisdic-
tion to enact laws regarding education.  In Ontario, these powers were exer-
cised for the public funding of Roman Catholic elementary schools at the same 
level as public secular schools.  In the 1980s legislation was proposed in Ontario 
that sought to extend the provision of publicly funded Roman Catholic schools 
to include secondary as well as primary education.  This was because, when the 
constitutional arrangements first were made, most people received only primary 
education and the changes were necessary to fulfill the spirit and intention of 
the agreement.  In Ontario, Roman Catholic Schools were the only religious 
schools entitled to the same public funding as public secular schools.  A legal 
challenge was brought on the basis that these provisions discriminated against 
non-Roman Catholic parents who wished their children to have a religious edu-
cation.  The question for the Canadian Supreme Court in Re: An Act to Amend 
the Education Act was whether the adoption of the Charter could change the 
Confederation bargain.42 
Section 29 of the Charter itself seems to have anticipated exactly this kind of 
challenge: “Nothing in this Charter abrogates or derogates from any rights or 
privileges guaranteed by or under the Constitution of Canada in respect of de-
nominational, separate or dissentient schools.”  The Supreme Court of Canada 
upheld the proposed legislation but made clear it did not need to rely on Sec-
tion 29 of the Charter in order to find the Constitution prevailed over the Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms.  According to Justice Wilson, “Their protection 
from Charter review lies not in the guaranteed nature of the rights and privi-
leges conferred by the legislation but in the guaranteed nature of the province’s 
plenary power to enact that legislation.”43  She had stated earlier, “It was never 
intended . . . that the Charter could be used to invalidate other provisions of the 
Constitution, particularly a provision such as s. 93 which represented a funda-
mental part of the Confederation compromise.”44 
Justice Estey concurred, saying, “Section 93 is a fundamental constitutional 
provision because it is a part of the pattern of the sharing of sovereign power 
between the two plenary authorities created at Confederation.”45  He likened it 
to the special provisions made for the preservation of Indian lands at confedera-
tion. 
 
 42. Re: An Act to Amend the Education Act [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 (Can.). 
 43. Id. at 1198. 
 44. Id. at 1197-98. 
 45. Id. at 1206. 
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The Supreme Court considered Section 93 fundamentally constitutive of 
Canada as a nation.  Without it, there would not be a nation.  It could not, 
therefore, be subordinated to the Charter’s equality protections.  To paraphrase 
the Supreme Court, the (internal) nation state, and the original compact under 
which it was formed, came first.  One could not use the Charter of Rights to un-
dermine the very nature of the nation state itself as originally founded.  There is 
recognition here of the historical and the constitutive elements of statehood on 
which other rights may depend.46  The Constitution, in this case, is symbolic of a 
shared history and values and represents an idea of nationhood.  It is an attempt 
to forge coherence between nationhood as a political, social, and legal phe-
nomenon.  As such, it does not serve merely instrumental ends.  As Justice 
Robert Jackson observed in another context, the Constitution is not a suicide 
pact.47 
In 1999, a Jewish parent challenged the Ontario education funding provi-
sions before the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR.48  The challenge again alleged the provisions were discriminatory and 
denied equal protection of the law to parents wishing to send their children to 
other religious schools.  This time the government was not prepared to concede 
(as it had earlier) that but for the provisions of the 1867 Constitution, the edu-
cation legislation breached the Charter.  The State Party relied on the argu-
ments of Justice Wilson in the Supreme Court and explained that 
without the protection of the rights of the Roman Catholic minority, the founding of 
Canada would not have been possible and that the separate school system remained a 
controversial issue, at times endangering the national unity in Canada.  The State 
Party explains that the funding is seen by the Roman Catholic community as the cor-
rection of an historical wrong. 49 
The State Party added that undoing the bargain made at Confederation would 
lead to outrage and economic turmoil.  The Human Rights Committee made 
short work of these arguments: “The Committee begins by noting that the fact 
that a distinction is enshrined in the Constitution does not render it reasonable 
and objective.”50 
The material before it did not show that Roman Catholics were now in a 
disadvantaged position compared to the Jewish Community.  Canada’s own 
fundamental commitments, including the pre-conditions of its founding, were 
treated as irrelevant.  The Committee appeared to assume that an individual’s 
 
 46. Though it is latent in the reasoning, some calculation of the risk of Quebec succession may 
have been operating. 
 47. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting), cited in 
MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAW 91 (2003). 
 48. Waldman v. Ontario Human Rights Committee 67th Session 1999. CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996. 
Notice that subsequently in Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Ass'n v. Ontario [2001] 1 S.C.R. 470, 
494, 510, Justice Iacobucci described Section 93 as animated by principles of "religious freedom and 
equitable treatment" and as guaranteeing similar rights to those protected by Section 23 of the Charter. 
 49. Id. at ¶ 8.3. 
 50. Id. at ¶10.4. 
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right to be free from discrimination is not preconditioned by the existence of a 
state, even if the state is the unit on which international law depends for the en-
forcement of such rights.  A finding of discrimination does not depend on the 
nature of the state or its constituent elements.  The only realm for shared values 
is the international community itself. 
How instead does the Human Rights Committee, working from within our 
archetypal version of the state tradition of international law, conceive of the 
state?  One reading of the decision would suggest that in order to preserve the 
unified permanence central to the idea of the state at international law, it is 
necessary for a state to be conceived as an empty, abstract, and ahistorical con-
cept.  Alternatively, one could locate this decision within a particular historical 
frame or system of shared values—that is the post-World War II Human Rights 
system. 
Despite the seeming agreement about substantive human rights values in 
these cases, one’s conception of the state is clearly crucial.  Higher law constitu-
tions do not serve only instrumental ends.  They also express shared values and 
come close to a domestic embodiment of statehood. 
B. A Hybrid Version of Statehood 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Europe seems to offer a hybridized version of the 
state in the human rights context.  In the case of Refah Partisi v. Turkey,51 the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights acknowledged de-
mocracy as the relevant constituent element of statehood.  The case involved a 
human rights challenge to the decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court to 
have the Refah political party dissolved on the basis that it was a “centre” of ac-
tivities contrary to the principles of secularism.  The Refah party, among other 
things, supported a system based on sharia law.  The Grand Chamber reiterated 
its view that democracy is a fundamental feature of the “European public or-
der.”52  It considered that that “there could be no democracy without plural-
ism”53 and viewed the state’s role as the “neutral and impartial organizer of the 
exercise of various religions, faiths, and beliefs.”54  Most clearly, the Court said 
that the freedoms guaranteed in the convention “cannot deprive the authorities 
of a State in which an association, through its activities, jeopardizes that State’s 
institutions, of the right to protect those institutions.”55  Human rights protec-
tion then, is subject to the state’s ability to survive as a democratic institution.  
Some compromise between defending democratic society and individual rights 
 
 51. Case of Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, European Court of Human 
Rights Grand Chamber, hearing 19 June 2002,  Application numbers 41340/98, 41342/98, and 41344/98. 
 52. Id. at para 86. 
 53. Id. at para 89. 
 54. Id. at para 91. 
 55. Id. at para 96. 
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is inherent: “no[ ]one must be authorized to rely on the conventions provisions 
in order to weaken or destroy the ideals or values of a democratic society.”56 
The argument that a democratic system is entitled to defend itself against 
political movements that seek to destroy it (described in the tribunal below as 
“militant democracy”57) is at odds with “pure” international legal conceptions 
of state.58  International law does not precondition whether a state exists on 
whether it is democratically ordered.  International law, moreover, appears to 
exhibit little interest in a state’s ability to survive in a particular constitutional 
form—as was demonstrated in the Waldman v. Ontario decision of the Human 
Rights Committee. 
The differences of approach between the Canadian and Turkish cases might 
be explained on the basis that the recent history, size, and success of the Refah 
Party, and Turkey’s role as a model of a secular Islamic state made the threats 
to the state’s very existence more real in the latter case.  However, at least in 
the Tribunal below, the Court went further and referred explicitly to the Euro-
pean experience of the use by totalitarian movements of democratic processes 
to do away with democracy.  It presented the German and Italian Constitutions 
as positive examples of the principle that to outlaw certain political movements 
is acceptable, even when there is no immediate threat.59 
The better view is that the approach taken to statehood by the Grand 
Chamber in Refah Partisi is quite distinct from the approach taken by the Hu-
man Rights Committee in Waldman v. Ontario.  The Grand Chamber portrayed 
Europe as a community of shared values and shared history—for which secular-
ism and democracy are central principles.  The European Court conceived of 
rights from within a community of shared values among individual states: a kind 
of hybridized version of statehood, situated between the domestic and interna-
tional legal conceptions, is operating here. 
The purpose of this part of the paper is not directly to raise large questions 
about cultural relativism or the universalism of human rights but rather to em-
phasize how important one’s conception of the state is to the analysis of the 
content of fundamental norms.60  The tension between how international law, 
domestic law, and the emerging law of Europe paradigmatically conceives of 
the state is all the more important, given that international law traditionally 
 
 56. Id. at para 99. 
 57. Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, Third Section Judgment of 31 July 
2001, at para 62. 
 58. Of course there are more nuanced versions within the international law tradition.  See, e.g., M 
KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
205-06 (2001). 
 59. Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, Third Section Judgment of 31 July 
2001, at para 62. 
 60. Another example of when the difference in domestic and international conceptions of the state 
matters is when the fragmented parts of the state are unified for the purpose of bringing a human rights 
claim but a government entity might itself wish to bring an administrative law challenge against another 
part of the state on the basis that it had overreached its powers. 
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frames the state as the primary enforcer of rights.  The state may not be prior to 
the law, and yet, enforcement of the law depends on the state for international 
law purposes.  This is a very unstable framework. 
How courts conceive of their role as elaborator and implementer of humani-
tarian norms may differ depending on whether they are operating within an in-
ternational or domestic model of the state.  The idea of unified norms always 
will be moderated through a particular conception of the state.  Notwithstand-
ing the permeability of the domestic and international systems to shared fun-
damental norms, difficult questions of translation sometimes will remain.61 
Nonetheless, the technique of creating global space by domestic courts en-
forcing the normative commitments of states in both their domestic and interna-
tional personas invites possibilities for a global administrative law.  In that sense 
it is a technique to engage national actors (judges) in the ex post administration 
of commitments made under treaty regimes.  How thoroughgoing it will be will 
depend on how much the substantive content of the commitment matters in ad-
dition to the fact of the commitment itself.62  The impact of this technique on 
the content of and broader participation in those treaty regimes is more uncer-
tain and indirect.63  That may depend on the ability of judges to create their own 
coordinated networks and on the feedback loops that can be established be-
tween judicial communities and the other actors involved in treaty making and 
elaboration.  In New Zealand and Australia, these developments have resulted 
in calls for greater transparency of treaty making processes as a matter of both 
domestic and international law.  Responses to such pressures have been limited. 
So far only the individual in her role as enforcer of pre-agreed commitments 
at both the international and domestic levels has been considered.  These ex-
amples engage with familiar actors and processes that both international and 
domestic lawyers would recognize as “governmental.”  The next example of the 
creation of global space takes one to more unfamiliar territory. 
V 
PERMEABILITY OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE  
INSTITUTIONS TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW VALUES: A BRIEF SKETCH 
There is of course, a range of techniques for global governance, as Kings-
bury, Krisch, and Stewart have identified.64  Two of the ideal types they describe 
 
 61. Neil Walker, Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation, in EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE 27-54 (J. H. H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003). 
 62. This is a question that David Dyzenhaus addresses in THE RULE OF (ADMINISTRATIVE) LAW 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Institute for International Law and Justice, Working Paper 2005/1, Global 
Administrative Law Series). 
 63. In terms of Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart's ideal types it is an example of distributed admini-
stration and may also indirectly give rise to collective action by government officials.  See Benedict 
Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
 64. Kingsbury et al., supra note 63. 
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are particularly problematic for the operation of a global administrative law: 
administration by hybrid intergovernmental-private arrangements, and admini-
stration by private institutions with regulatory functions.  As before, rather than 
identify the technique for creating space for global governance as necessarily 
the same as identifying the site for global administrative law, this paper evalu-
ates which of the functions and techniques of administrative law earlier identi-
fied are likely to be effective, given the technique by which the global space has 
been created. 
An important strategy that facilitates the integration of domestic and inter-
national conception of the state has been to disaggregate the state within both 
spheres into functional units and to divest some of those functions to private en-
tities or public–private hybrid entities.65  This particular strategy for the creation 
of global space may, however, pose the largest challenge for the application of 
administrative law values and techniques.  Indeed, the risk is that to suggest 
administrative law operates in such a space may be merely to invoke adminis-
trative law’s legitimacy conferring function without much more. 
This process began domestically with the functional reorganization of the in-
stitutions of domestic government across most of the OECD, the fragmentation 
and outsourcing of formerly governmental activities, and the “corporatization” 
or divestment of formerly public utilities and other “commercial” activities.  
Simultaneously, these are the very processes that have facilitated the increased 
reach of transnational corporations, the development of networks and epistemic 
communities, and, in short, enhanced the prospects for transnational forms of 
government.  Transnational governance would not be possible if it were not for 
the functional reorganization of the domestic state.  The labels “domestic” and 
“international” are no longer apt.  “Government” has been replaced by the de-
liberately ambiguous word “governance.” 
Given that the reorganization of the state into functional units and subse-
quent divestment of “public” functions to private or hybrid entities began as a 
domestic phenomenon, much can be learned from the response of domestic 
administrative law to the challenges these developments have posed.  That is 
not to identify the “problem” as being that such global spaces cannot be 
reached by domestic administrative law, but rather to question whether admin-
istrative law, as we know or are able to imagine it, has or will have the capacity 
to respond.  The focus of the critique is not so much the global nature of the 
administrative law project but on the nature and content of administrative law 
itself. 
Because all administrative law is quite sector-specific, it is important to be as 
specific as possible in terms of examples.  The first is the domestic example of 
the divestment of direct government ownership and control of utilities within 
New Zealand.  Some utilities were completely privatized (many being trans-
 
 65. See, e.g.,  the divestment of formerly public owned and operated utilities in the U.K., Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand. 
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ferred to transnational corporations) and thus put beyond the reach of domestic 
administrative law.  Most were, at least for a time, transferred to hybrid public–
private bodies.  The effect was that when politically unpopular decisions needed 
to be made, government was able to distance itself from such decisionmaking 
and to attribute unpopular decisions to separate entities invoking commercial 
imperatives.  However, when government really did want to intervene (this time 
invoking political imperatives), for example, to repudiate logging contracts for 
scarce native timber, it was able to do so without administrative law constraints 
or ordinary contractual consequences.66  Locating power and accountability 
within this institutional form has proved difficult in the extreme. 
And yet the problem has not been that administrative law did not reach such 
bodies.  Indeed there has been a series of cases in which claimants sought to es-
tablish whether the ex post constraints of judicial review would apply in the hy-
brid public–private setting.  After a judicial tousle, the Privy Council reversed 
the Court of Appeal and found that such bodies were subject to the disciplines 
of judicial review.67  In acknowledgement of the commercial context, however, 
it made clear it would intervene only in the most limited and non-commercial 
settings and only in circumstances in which the most extreme abuses of power 
had occurred.  For all practical purposes, the limited circumstances under which 
such bodies could be restrained rendered judicial control illusory.  No further 
“successful” challenges have been brought. 
What of the other devices of administrative law?  Fierce debates have taken 
place on the question whether the public should have access to the information 
held by these hybrid bodies.  A Parliamentary select committee was successful 
in forestalling their removal from the coverage of the access to information re-
gime under the Official Information Act 1982.  In practice, however, much of 
the content of such information has been withheld because disclosure would 
adversely affect the commercial interests of such bodies.  It may be that the ap-
plication of these various administrative law mechanisms lends legitimacy but 
not much else to the governance of such bodies. 
The British experience of applying administrative law disciplines to private 
entities that exercise regulatory functions is potentially even more instructive.  
The leading case of R v. Panel of Take-Overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc68 
involved an attempt to impugn a decision of the Panel of Mergers and Take-
overs ex post because it had misapplied its own rules when approving a merger.  
The Panel is a private entity without “visible means of legal support” whose 
members are important players in the London financial markets.  After much 
judicial exegesis, the Court concluded that the Panel was subject to the disci-
 
 66. See also Janet McLean, Government to State: Globalization, Regulation, and Governments as 
Legal Persons 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 173, 186-88 (2003). 
 67. Mercury Energy v. Electricity Corporation of New Zealand [1994] 1 WLR 521 [PC] reversing 
Auckland Electric Power Board v. Electricity Corporation of New Zealand [1994] 1 N.Z.L.R. 551, 559 
[CA]. 
 68. [1987] 1 QB 815. 
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plines and constraints of judicial review.  However, Sir John Donaldson MR 
added that intervention in the work of such a body should be restricted to al-
lowing prospective declarations concerning the meaning of the Panel’s rules 
(rules incidentally that the Panel was able to make and change without notice or 
comment).69  There was no question of the court’s intervening to unravel deci-
sions already made.  To allow more by way of potential judicial intervention 
would have undermined the very reasons for reposing such decisions in the 
Panel in the first place.  Timely, expeditious, market informed, and expert deci-
sionmaking would be undermined by anything more by way of administrative 
law constraints.  Again, the main function of administrative law here seems to 
be to legitimate as “governance” the functions of the Panel. 
These examples raise a number of questions about how administrative law 
will operate in relation to the global versions of similar entities.  A central ques-
tion will be this: Why was the mode of governance selected in the first place, 
and how much will that choice of instrument or institution be undermined by 
the constraints and disciplines of administrative law?  Institutional choices 
themselves convey and commit to particular norms of decisionmaking. 
It also will be important to identify the kinds of claims to expertise that are 
operating in a particular institutional setting.  Are the claims to “expertise” also 
claims to information neither shared nor able to be shared with the general pub-
lic, governments, or courts?  If so, the techniques of administrative law are 
likely to have a limited impact.  Expert institutions often are regarded as avoid-
ing the worst kinds of political behavior and as bringing both technical expertise 
and deliberative processes to the resolution of problems.  But, as in the domes-
tic system, the very qualities that make the use of bureaucratic institutions at-
tractive are also the factors that present the greatest challenges. 
It may well be that, to paraphrase Eyal Benvenisti,70 administrative law ac-
curately reflects the balance of power in any given system.  That is not necessar-
ily to derogate from the central thesis that the ways global space is created are 
important to if distinct from the application of administrative law within those 
spaces.  Indeed it may be argued that certain power dynamics further the crea-
tion of particular global spaces in the first instance. 
Administrative law is facing fundamental challenges to its relevance and ef-
fectiveness in the domestic sphere.  These challenges have their source in some 
of the central forces for the creation of transnational government itself.  The 
challenges for administrative law will be even greater in these new international 
and transnational regulatory spheres. 
 
 69. Id. at 842 D. 
 70. Eyal Benvenisti, The Interplay Between Actors as a Determinant of the Evolution of Administra-
tive Law in International Institutions, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
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VI 
CONCLUSION 
This paper posits that there are radically different conceptions of the state at 
international and domestic law.  Colonial law and dualism have, for a time, dis-
guised these differences.  The strategies for transnational government most 
likely to be successful are those that integrate the state in its international and 
domestic personas.  One such strategy is the use of domestic administrative and 
constitutional law as a channel for fundamental norms.  However, in some 
cases, even this strategy will have to confront how the constituent elements of 
the state differ under these competing conceptions.  Further, and paradoxically, 
the paper suggests that some of the very strategies enhancing the prospects for 
transnational government may also threaten the applicability of administrative 
law values at both the domestic and international levels. 
